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Absztrakt. 
A  dolgozat  célja  egy  vállalati  gyakorlatból  származó  eset  elemzése.  Egy  könyvkiadót 
tekintünk. A kiadó kapcsolatban van kis- és nagykereskedıkkel, valamint a fogyasztók egy 
csoportjával is vannak kapcsolatai. A könyvkiadók projekt rendszerben mőködnek. A kiadó 
azzal a problémával szembesül, hogy hogyan ossza el egy frissen kiadott és nyomtatott könyv 
példányszámait a kis- és nagykereskedık között, valamint mekkora példányszámot tároljon 
maga  a  fogyasztók  közvetlen  kielégítésére.  A  kiadóról  feltételezzük,  hogy  visszavásárlási 
szerzıdése van a kereskedıkkel. A könyv iránti kereslet nem ismert, de becsülhetı. A kis- és 
nagykereskedık maximalizálják a nyereségüket. 
 
Kulcsszavak: Optimalizálás, Újságárus fiú probléma, Készletgazdálkodás, Visszavásárlási szerzıdés 
 
 
 
Abstract. 
 
The aim of the paper is to analyze a practical real world problem. A publishing house is given. 
The publishing firm has contacts to a number of wholesaler / retailer enterprises and direct 
contact to customers to satisfy the market demand. The book publishers work in a project 
industry. The publisher faces with the problem how to allocate the stocks of a given, newly 
published  book  to  the  wholesaler  and  retailer,  and  to  hold  some  copies  to  satisfy  the 
customers direct from the publisher. The publisher has a buyback option. The distribution of 
the  demand  is  unknown,  but  it  can  be  estimated.  The  wholesaler  /  retailer  maximize  the 
profits. 
 
The  problem  can  be  modeled  as  a  one-warehouse  and  N-retailer  supply  chain  with  not 
identical demand distribution. The model can be transformed in a game theory problem. It is 
assumed that the demand distribution follows a Poisson distribution. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of our paper is to analyze the inventory decisions of a book publishing firm. We 
examine a practical real world problem, based on book market characteristics, considering 
some specialty of Hungarian book market. 
The book publishers work in a project industry: every title (book) represents an individual 
project, and the publishers have to decide among others about the printed quantity, the price 
of the given newly published title and the inventory allocation in the different distribution 
channels (influenced by the claims of the wholesalers and retailers). In this paper we will 
focus on the inventory allocation problem, including buyback and return policy.  
The publishing firm has contacts to a number of wholesaler and retailer enterprises and direct 
contact to customers to satisfy the market demand.  The publisher faces with the problem to 
allocate the stocks of a given, newly published book to the wholesaler and retailer, and to hold 
some copies to satisfy the customers direct from the publisher. The distribution of the demand 
is  unknown,  but  it  can  be  estimated.  The  publisher  has  information  about  the 
wholesalers/retailers orders, as well as their past sales, but do not have information about the 
demand and sales of other retailers in the supply chain who contact the wholesalers. The 
buyback (return) agreements as well as the consignment mode are common types of contracts 
in publishing industry, it follows that the retailers have  a possibility to return the unsold 
inventories with a small or without any charges, and the risk is taken by the publisher. (Ru 
and Wang (2010) or Zhang et al. (2010)) 
In this paper we investigate a publishing supply chain with buyback contracts. In the literature 
there are a lot of papers dealing with this problem. A manufacturer-retailer model with return 
policies was first analyzed by Pasternack (1985). He has suggested using the newsvendor 
model to determine the optimal order quantity. A number of scientists have extended his 
results.  Zhang  el  al.  (2005)  have  generalized  the  basic  model  with  rebate  contract.  Gong 
(2008) introduces the information asymmetry in the analysis. Ding and Chen (2008) have 
shown that the analytical tool can be applied to examine a three level supply chain. These 
papers investigate the situation with a demand of exogenously given distribution function. 
Several authors analyze the newsvendor type supply chains with price-dependent demand, 
e.g. Petruzzi and Dada (1999), Arcelus et al. (2008), Sediri and Nakade (2010), and Nakade et 
al. (2010). These last two papers examine the order level situation from the point of view of 
the game theory. 
 
The problem in the paper is modeled as a one-warehouse and N-retailer supply chain with not 
identical  demand  distributions.  The  problem  structure  is  similar  to  that  of  a  newsvendor 
model. It is assumed that the random demand follows a Poisson distribution. We have chosen 
this distribution, because the demand process of selling books can be characterized with this 
random process. 
 
The paper organizes, as follows. First, we present briefly the background of the problem: 
product and market characteristics, as well as the main decisions of the publisher, pointing out 
some influencing factors. In the third section we show the parameters, decision variables and 
the costs functions of the model. The next section deals with the properties of the model, and 
solves the model.  In the fifth section we supply  two special cases of the model, and we 
present the optimal strategies to these cases. The sixth section supplies numerical examples to 
characterize the structure of an optimal solution. And last we summarize the results of the 
paper. 
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2.  The  background  of  the  problem:  book  industry  characteristics  and  publisher’s 
decisions 
 
In this section we describe very briefly the specialty of book industry: product, market and 
supply chain characteristics, the relationship between the actors and the publisher’s decisions 
concerning inventories in a given project. We focus on the market of printed books. The 
spread of the e-books could modify the demand of the printed books, but the main decision 
points for the publishers (and the main parameters of the model built) do not change.  
The decision about printed quantity as well as about the stock allocation is a key issue for the 
publisher everywhere, but it is particular in case of small markets and the books published in 
languages not-widely known and used. One of the specialty of the Hungarian and other ‘small 
languages’ book markets that in the most of cases (except the bestsellers) the demand just 
slightly  exceeds  or  sometimes  do  not  hit  the  quantity  of  economic  printing.  This  feature 
emphasizes the importance of the inventory allocation decisions. After the initial inventory 
level decision is made (Dobos – Wimmer (2010)), the allocation and return (buyback) policies 
have a strong impact on the sales and the profit of the publisher.   
 
2.1. Product, market and supply chain characteristics in the book industry 
 
The book publishing is based on projects: every new title represents a new project for the 
publisher. Past experiences about similar titles could be useful, but every product is different 
with different demand. The customers could buy books from the retailers or order the titles 
via internet from booksellers or directly from the publishers. The demand is unknown, but 
could be estimated.  
The publisher – after deciding to starting a given project and make ready a manuscript to print 
–  have  to  decide  about  technical  characteristics  of  the  printing  (printing  quality  of  the 
product), first printed quantity of the title, the (retail) price of the title, marketing budget of 
the product, inventory allocation in the different distribution channels.  
The  publishing  firm  could  satisfy  the  market  demand  by  different  types  of  distribution 
channels: wholesalers (some of them have self-owned retail-network), retailers and directly 
contact to individual customers. The liberty of the inventory allocation decision is limited: the 
publishing firm proposes a certain quantity for the wholesalers / retailers (what they accept or 
not), and could decide to deliver or not the whole quantity ordered by the wholesalers. The 
publishing firm couldn’t influence the allocation of the stock in the retailer-network managed 
by  wholesalers.  The  publisher  has  not  detailed  information  about  the  sales  at  the 
distribution/sales  points,  just  about  orders  and  sales  of  his  direct  partners,  wholesalers  or 
retailers or customers. The wholesalers and retailers channels cumulate the sales of several 
retail-points in some cases but do not share the information about it with the publisher. For 
that reason the system works as a one manufacturer (warehouse) N retailers system from the 
publisher’s point of view. 
The buyback (return) agreements as well as the consignment mode are common in publishing 
industry. The retailers order a certain quantity, and the publisher could decide about satisfying 
these claims or not, considering the possibility of shortage as well as the reallocation policy 
(for example the probability and the cost of sales in different channels). In the Hungarian 
book market the retailers report monthly about the quantity sold and pay after just for the 
copies sold in the most of cases, and could return the copies unsold without taking risk. The 
wholesalers and retailers have right to return the unsold copies without any or with a small 
charges. Under consignment the retailer sells the product for the supplier with the supplier 
taking inventory risk (Lai et al. (2009)).  Both these types of contracts  reduce the risk of   5 
buyers,  inducing  them  to  place  larger  orders,  at  the  same  time  increase  the  risk  of  the 
publisher. The main differences are in (1) the ownerships of inventories physically held by the 
retailers (owned by the retailers with a buyback guarantee in the first case, while owned by 
the publisher in the case of consignment type of contracts), and (2) cash-flows (in the case of 
buyback system the retailers have to or could – but not necessary – pay before sold products, 
while under consignment they do not pay just for copies sold and reported for the publisher). 
The  material  flows  are  similar  with  a  possibility  to  reallocate/return  inventories.  The 
difference in cash flows is mainly influenced by not the type of the contract but the terms of 
payment by agreement (as well as the willingness to pay). In this paper we focus on inventory 
allocation with buyback agreements. 
The retail prices are fixed, determined by the publisher. Sometimes the booksellers and the 
publishing firms could give discounts for customer buying via internet or members of the 
book clubs etc., even in the case of new titles. These rebates represent a variable cost for the 
sellers, but do not modify the wholesale price. 
The wholesale price is the selling price reduced by the commercial price margin according to 
the  actual  contract  between  the  wholesaler  (the  retailer)  and  the  publisher.  The  dominant 
actors  in  the  supply  chain  are  the  wholesalers:  there  is  a  bargain  procedure  between  the 
wholesalers and the publisher, as well as between the wholesalers and the retailer, but the 
margins are determined by the wholesalers. (This margin is actually about 50% of the retail 
price  in  Hungarian  book  market.)  Payables  turnover  days  are  different.  The  elapsed  time 
between  the  realization  of  sales,  the  sales  report  and  the  payment  increase  the  cost  of 
financing for the publishers.  
During  the  lifecycle  of  a  given  title,  the  publisher  could  (or  have  to)  decide  about  the 
followings:  reallocate  the  inventories,  recall  the  copies  unsold  from  certain  retailers 
(wholesalers) and deliver to the other who ordered, to reprint (or not) the title, the timing and 
the quantity of the reprint, increase marketing efforts (and budget), give price reduction, etc. 
In this paper we assume that the first printed quantity and the pricing decisions are made and 
the  publisher  has  to  decide  about  the  allocation  of  the  inventories  (within  constraints 
mentioned). We assume that the publisher allocate the available quantity, and do not consider 
the reprint the title neither to change the price or made marketing efforts to increase sales.  
We assume that decision makers maximize their profits. 
 
2.2. Costs of the publishing firm 
 
Fixed costs represent a relatively large proportion of the publishing costs: the first element is 
the cost of make ready a manuscript to print, that independent of the quantity printed as well 
as of the quantity sold. The marketing efforts could consider fixed costs as well. The printing 
cost consists of fixed and variable parts. The proportion of the fixed cost (the setup cost) is 
large;  the  cost  of  first  print  could  be  high.  The  unit  cost  of  printing  could  significantly 
decrease when the order quantity is higher. While the decision about the printed quantity is 
made, the unit cost of the products (c) could be calculated.  
In considering inventory allocation problems, the most of the cost are variable: inventories are 
financed by the publisher until the retailers (wholesalers) do not report and pay  after the 
copies sold. Warehousing cost is paid after the stocks in a central warehouse of the publisher, 
mainly determined by the quantity.    6 
The revenue of the publisher is the wholesale price (w), which is equal to the retail price (p) of 
copies sold decreased by the commercial price margin. In other point of view, the margin of 
the retailers / wholesalers (p − w) is a variable cost for the publisher occurring when the 
copies sold are paid. The real wholesale price (and cost for the publisher) depends on not just 
the wholesale price margin agreed but on the real payment period (retailers’ willingness to 
pay).  
Than the variables costs of the publisher consist of the following elements: 
(1) Inventory holding costs (h) which consist of a financing cost of unsold inventories and 
the warehousing cost of the inventories physically held in the central warehouse. 
(2) Wholesalers’ price margin (p − w) after copies sold (different in different distributions 
channels)  
The opportunity costs could hardly estimate. Inventory shortage at the point of sales could 
cause  lost  sales.  The  cost  of  the  publishing  house  is  higher  (and  profit  is  lower)  if  the 
customers buy in a channel with higher cost (higher commercial price margin) – that’s why 
the use of most costly distribution channel represent a kind of opportunity cost. (Although to 
decide do not use this most costly channels could cause lost sales.) 
 
3.  The model 
 
We will use the following notations. 
 
Parameters of the model: 
 
- n  number of the retailer, 
- p  selling price of the book, 
- cv  variable costs of the publishing house, 
- h0  inventory holding costs of the publishing house, 
- r  proportion of the books stored at the central warehouse of the publisher, 
- Q   quantity of the maximal printed books,  
- wi  wholesale price of retailer i, (i=1,2,…,n), 
- hi  inventory holding costs of retailer i, (i=1,2,…,n), 
- bi  buyback costs of retailer i, (i=1,2,…,n), 
- Di  random demand for retailer i, (i=1,2,…,n), 
- λi  parameter of the Poisson distribution for retailer i, (i=1,2,…,n). 
 
The probability of demand of the Poisson distribution has the next form: 
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We assume that the random demands of the retailers are independent. This assumption means 
that the cumulated probability of the demand for the publishing houses follows a Poisson 
distribution as well: 
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and the cumulated distribution 
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Decision variables: 
 
- Q0  the number of the books published by the publishing house, 
- Qi  the number of the ordered books from the publishing house. 
 
Figure 1. Material flow of the system. (One-warehouse n-retailer.) 
 
 
 
We can assume that the number of published books (the printed quantity) is not higher than 
that of books ordered by retailers from publishing house. For the published books we have 
introduced  an upper bound  Q . This upper bound shows the financial possibilities of the 
publishing house. It is formulated, as 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. retailer 
2. retailer 
3. retailer 
n. retailer 
… 
Publishing house 
Q0 
Q1 
Q2 
Qi 
Q3 
Qn   8 
 
( ) ( ) Q r Q r Q
n
i
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1 1 0
1
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This problem can be modeled as a one-warehouse and n-retailer supply chain. The material 
flow of the system is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Let us now construct the profit functions. The model consists of (n + 1) profit functions: profit 
function of the publishing house and n profit functions of the retailers. We model the case 
from the point of view of the publishing house. The publishing house wants to maximize the 
profits, so that the house does not know the precise costs of the retailers, but estimates them. 
 
First we construct the profit function of the publishing house. We assume that the profit 
function of the publishing house consists of the total wholesale reduced by the production 
(variable) costs, inventory holding costs, and the buyback costs. Then the profit function of 
the publishing house P0(Q0) is the following: 
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The expected profit function is 
 
( ) ( ) { } ∑ ∑
= =
- × - × × + - × = P
n
i
i i i v
n
i
i i D Q E b Q r h c Q w Q E
1
0 0
1
0 0 , 0 max . 
 
The profit functions of the retailers are modeled as follows. We assume that the publishing 
house has no information about the cost parameters of the retailers. It has only estimations 
about cost parameters hi. The fixed and variable costs of retailers are totally unknown for the 
publishing house. The profit function of retailer i is as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) { } { } { } i i i i i i i i i i i i i D Q h Q D p D Q b Q w p Q - × - - × - - × + × - = P , 0 max 0 , max , 0 max , (i=1,2,…,n). 
 
The expected profit function of retailer i is 
 
( ) ( ) { } { } { } i i i i i i i i i i i i D Q E h Q D E p D Q E b Q w p Q E - × - - × - - × + × - = P , 0 max 0 , max , 0 max , (i=1,2,…,n). 
 
The goal of the retailers is to maximize his profit function. A retailer has no information about 
the ordering rules of the other retailers, so these decisions are independent each other. 
 
We can now summarize our model, as a game theory model. The problem is the following: 
 
( ) max ® P i i Q E , (i=0,1,2,…,n),                (1) 
 
such that 
 
( ) 0
1
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n
i
i × - £ ∑
=
.                    (2)   9 
 
In the next section we examine the proposed model. We will show that this model is a game 
and we look for the optimal solution of this problem. 
 
4. Some properties of the model and its solution 
 
The problem (1)-(2) can be interpreted, as a non-cooperative game with (n + 1) player. We 
prove that the Nash equilibrium of this inventory game is Pareto optimal, so the competitive 
solution is in this special case a cooperative game solution, as well. 
 
Property 1. 
It holds in the optimal solution:  ( )
o
n
i
o
i Q r Q 0
1
1 × - = ∑
=
.           (3) 
 
It is easy to see that this property is held. The profit function of the publishing house is linear 
in the quantity of published books, so the profit function is optimal if this quantity is the 
smallest. 
 
Property 2. 
The optimal solution of model (1)-(2) is a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof. Let us assume that we have calculated the optimal solution of the problem, and optimal 
solution is values { }
n
i
o
i Q 0 = . First analyze the number of published books 
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optimal retailer quantities { }
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This problem can be solved, and the optimal solution is value 
o Q0 . It is easy to see that the 
optimal number of published books is equal to 
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If we investigate a retailer i, then the next problem must be solved: 
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The  solution  of  this  problem  is  simple,  see  for  example  Naddor  (1966).  With  this  last 
proposition we have proved this property. 
 
The property has shown that the equilibrium of this non-cooperative game is a Pareto optimal 
solution. 
 
Property 3. 
The Nash equilibrium of model (1)-(2) is a Pareto optimal solution. 
 
Proof. The first property holds for the optimal solution of problem (1)-(2). Let us reformulate 
the problem: 
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0
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The optimal solution of this problem is Nash equilibrium, and the cumulated profit function is 
a Pareto optimum. So the Pareto optimal solution of this problem is a cooperative solution of 
game (1)-(2). With this proposition we have proved that the solution is a Pareto optimal. 
 
5. The strategy concepts to the model 
 
In this section of the paper we examine two special policies of the model: decentralized and 
centralized solutions. In the first case the publishing house maximizes his profit and then a 
specified quantity of books is offered to the retailers. The centralized model analyzes the 
cooperative solution presented in the last chapter. In this paper we do not investigate the 
distribution  of  the  excess  profit  of  this  cooperative  solution  of  the  model  between  the 
participants. 
 
5.1. Decentralized solution of the model 
 
The decentralized model describes the situation where the publishing house and the retailers 
optimize  independently,  we  mean  the  publishing  house  determines  its  optimal  inventory 
strategy  first  (the  market  demand  is  given  exogenously),  then  she  supplies  the  necessary 
quantity of books to meet the demand. Then the retailers accept the supplied quantity and 
maximize their own profit. 
 
After substitution of equation (3) in the profit function of the publisher we have the following 
function to optimize: 
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such that 
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If the next relations hold, then the optimum is found: 
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  for  the 
publishing house. The conditions show that in this situation the financial possibilities are not 
used fully. 
 
In other case we introduce the Lagrange function: 
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with the Lagrange multiplier  . 
 
The optimal solution is now 
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The solutions depend on the Lagrange multiplier  , and we can find the optimal multiplier so 
that  ( ) ( ) Q r Q
n
i
i × - = ∑
=
1
1
m .  In  the  numerical  examples  section  we  present  cases  for  both 
solution. 
 
5.2. Centralized solution of the model 
 
In this section we solve the centralized model, i.e. the model, where the publisher and retailers 
coordinate their decisions. This coordination means that the participants, i.e. the publisher and 
retailers, sum up the profit functions and they maximize the total profit of the system. Of 
course, this solution is a Pareto solution. The model is as follows 
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such that   12 
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For this model the optimal solution is 
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If the last inequalities do not hold then we solve the problem with Lagrange function: 
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The optimal solutions are 
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£ -
1
1 2
1
0 m
, (i=1,2,…,n). 
 
For this case we must look for an appropriate multiplier  , as well. With this last result we 
have solved the model  for two special strategies.  In the next section  we demonstrate the 
functioning of the models. 
 
6. Numerical examples 
 
In this section we present two examples to demonstrate our offered strategy. We assume that 
the publishing house provides books for three retailers, n = 3. In this numerical example we 
assume that the selling price is 20 units, i.e. p = 20, the variable cost is 2, i.e. cv = 2, and the 
inventory holding cost of the publishing house is 1.2 unit, h0 = 1.2. It is assumed that the 
publishing house sells first only fifty percent of the printed books, r = 0.5, and the maximal 
printable quantity of the books is 600,  600 = Q . The other data of the retailers is shown in 
table 1. 
 
Table 1. Parameters of the numerical examples 
 
   
Retailer 1 
 
 
Reatiler 2 
 
Retailer 3 
Parameter  of  the 
Poisson  distribution 
(λi) 
 
110 
 
90 
 
70 
Wholesale price (wi)  10  9  12 
Buyback cost (bi)  8  7.2  9.6 
Inventory  holding 
cost (hi) 
 
1.2 
 
1.08 
 
1.44 
   13 
First we examine the decentralized strategy of the proposed model. In this case the publishing 
house maximizes his profit and this information are supplied to the retailers. The problem is 
now to solve the next problem: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )  


 


× × - × - × +
+  


 


× × - × - × +  


 


× × - × - × =
∑
∑ ∑
-
=
-
-
=
-
-
=
-
1
0
70
3 3
1
0
90
2 2
1
0
110
1 1 3 2 1
3
2 1
!
70
6 . 9 8 . 6
!
90
2 . 7 8 . 3
!
110
8 8 . 4 , ,
Q
k
k
Q
k
k Q
k
k
dec
e
k
k Q Q
e
k
k Q Q e
k
k Q Q Q Q Q L
 
 
such that 
 
300 3 2 1 £ + + Q Q Q . 
 
Using the results of section 5, the solution is the following: Q1 = 113, Q2 = 90, and Q3 = 74. 
The optimal printed number of books for this case is 594 pieces which is under the upper 
bound.  The  profit  of  the  participants  of  the  supply  chain  is:  ( ) 35 . 1258 596 0 = P E , 
( ) 3 . 1347 113 1 = P E ,  ( ) 76 . 1088 596 2 = P E , and  ( ) 545 . 833 74 3 = P E . 
 
Let us now solve the centralized strategy. The mathematical problem can be written in the 
next form: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ∑
∑ ∑
-
=
-
-
=
-
-
=
-
× × - × -
- × × - × - × × - × - + + × =
1
0
70
3
1
0
90
2
1
0
110
1 3 2 1 3 2 1
3
2 1
!
70
44 . 21
!
90
08 . 21
!
110
2 . 21 8 . 34 , ,
Q
k
k
Q
k
k Q
k
k
cent
e
k
k Q
e
k
k Q e
k
k Q Q Q Q Q Q Q L
 
 
such that 
 
300 3 2 1 £ + + Q Q Q . 
 
The solution is now: Q1 = 121, Q2 = 101, and Q3 = 78. The optimal printed number of books 
for this case is 600 pieces which is on the upper bound, i.e. the publishing house prints all of 
the maximal possible pieces of books. The profit of the participants of the supply chain is: 
( ) 28 . 1232 596 0 = P E ,  ( ) 17 . 1747 113 1 = P E ,  ( ) 38 . 1634 596 2 = P E , and  ( ) 65 . 1031 74 3 = P E . 
 
Compared the two examples, we can point out that the publishing house maximizes his profit 
in  case  of  decentralized  strategy.  Bit  the  total  profit,  i.e.  the  cumulated  profit  of  the 
participants  of  the  supply  chain  is  much  higher  after  cooperation.  The  total  profit  in 
decentralized  strategy  is  4527.96  units  and  in  centralized  strategy  5645.45.  We  do  not 
investigate the redistribution of the excess profit in this paper. 
 
7.  Conclusions and further research 
 
In this paper we have presented a supply chain with newsvendor-type inventory holding costs. 
We have investigated a real publishing house with retailers. The publishing house wants to 
determine the optimal number of published books and the expected books ordering of the   14 
retailers. The random demands for books of the retailers are known from former demands 
pattern. The aim of the publishing house is to minimize the expected costs so that the retailers 
minimize the inventory holding costs. 
 
To solve the problem, we have shown that this problem leads to a game theory model. The 
players of the game are the publishing house and the retailers. The structure of the problem is 
very simple, so the Nash equilibrium of the problem is a Pareto efficient solution, as well. 
After that we have offered a numerical method to determine the optimal ordering policy. 
 
This model analyzes the buyback contracts between the publishing house and the retailers. In 
the  real  world  the  retailers  apply  a  consignment  stock  (CS)  contract  or  vendor  managed 
inventory (VMI) system. The order level could differ significantly that of level without CS or 
VMI systems. In a next paper this problem can be examined. A second problem is to look for 
redistribution schemes of the excess profit in case of cooperation which is a central proble of 
the cooperative game theory. 
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